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THE PROPOSED REGULATION OF
CORPORATE TENDER OFFERS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, no unifom regulatory system exists within the European
Community (the "EC") to govern corporate tender offers. With the
establishment of a truly unified market, the creation of a comprehensive
and uniform system for the regulation of European corporate tender offers
is becoming increasingly important. Recently, European companies have
been engaging in mergers and acquisitions at a scale and a pace never
before experienced.' A driving force behind the recent activity is the
desire of many European corporate leaders to better position their
companies for the barrier-free market envisioned for Europe.
2
As the number of corporate takeovers within the EC increases, the
need for uniform tender offer regulation has become increasingly
necessary. The variations in regulatory schemes among EC member states
conceming tender offers are significant. Some member states, such as the
United Kingdom, have a highly sophisticated and very satisfactory
regulatory system currently in place
3 
while other members, such as
Denmark and Greece, have very limited tender-offer regulation. Present
regulation within the EC varies dramatically with regard to the rights and
obligations of both the offeror and the target company: such variations
1. Steven Greenhouse, Merger Mania Strikes Europe as Barrier-Free Market Nears, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1988, at At, [hereinafter Greenhouse, Merger Mania]. Major mergers
involving EC-based companies increased from 117 in 1983 to 303 in 1987. Id. For fiscal year
1988 the figure was 450. Id. In 1988, there were nearly 500 mergers and acquisitions within
Europe which had a total value of $81.5 billion as compared with a total value of only $11.1
billion in 1985. Steven Greenhouse, Europe's Buyout Bulge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1989, at Ft
(hereinafter Ceenhouse, Buyout Bulge]. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions amounted to
42.4% of all intra-European deals in 1988 as compared to only 13.8% in 1985. Id. at F6.
2. Greenhouse, Merger Mania, supra note 1, at Al.
3. In the United Kingdom, corporate takeovers are regulated by stant and administered by
the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. CrrY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS (Release
35:10-vii--89), at 4513 [hereinafter Ciry CODE].
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include mandatory disclosure requirements; the rights granted to share-
holders; the procedure for launching an offer; the rights of the target
company's employees; and the defensive action permitted by the target
company's management and its board of directors to frustrate a tender
offer. Additionally, differences exist as to the fornal requirements of an
offer document and the amount of flexibility permitted for revising,
withdrawing, or responding to a competing takeover bid. Of particular
concern are the various defenses against hostile takeovers permitted by a
number of member countries. There is also a very basic difference as to
the rights of corporate shareholders that must be addressed. The Anglo-
Saxon tradition emphasizes the capital market and shareholder value, while
in Continental Europe an institutional view of companies with share-capital
predominates. In the latter system, the interests of the company do not
necessarily correspond to the interests of the shareholders.
4
Against this background, the Commission for the European Communi-
ties (the "Commission") has drafted a Proposal for a Thirteenth Council
Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids
(the "Proposed Directive").
5 
This Note will briefly discuss the history of
the company law harmonization program in the EC and briefly review
aspects of takeover regulation currently in place in some of the larger
member states, particularly the United Kingdom.
6 This Note will then
examine the Proposed Directive and comment on its possible effectiveness.
I. A BRIEF EC COMPANY LAW HISTORY
The Treaty of Rome established the EC in order to create a common
economic bloc.
7 
To achieve this goal the Treaty of Rome proposed four
basic freedoms that were to form the cornerstone of the economic union
within the Community: the freedom of movement of goods, people,
4. See generally J.M.M. MAItER & K. GEENs, DEFENSIVE MEAsuREs AGAINST HOSTILE
TAKEOVERS IN THE COMMON MARKET (1990) [hereinafter HOSTILE TAKEOVERS].
5. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and
Other General Bids, COM(88) 823 final at 2 [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
6. The United Kingdom is of paeticular importance because it has by far the largest corporate
takeover market in Europe. Britain has the biggest stock market, half of the continents publicly
held companies, and the largest collection of industrial giants. Joann S. Lublin & Craig
Forman, Banik of Britain: Europe's Merger Boom Triggers an Invasion by U.S. Deal Makers,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1989, at 1.
7. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. See Christopher Cmickshank, Insider Trading and the EEC,
10 INVL Bus. LAw. 345 (1982).
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services, and capital. An important idea behind the "four freedoms" was
the "right of establishment."
9 
The right of establishment provides that
companies from one member state should be able to conduct their business
in another member state and enjoy the same privileges and treatment as a
local company.'
0 
To further this goal, the Treaty of Rome grants the
World Commission the authority to establish regulations for the protection
of members, with an eye towards establishing uniform standards for com-
panies throughout the EC."
The "company law harmonization program," the name given to the
process of creating uniform company laws throughout the EC, is a large-
scale attempt by the EC to safeguard workers, shareholders, and the public
against certain kinds of corporate wrongdoing.
2 
To achieve this end, the
Treaty of Rome grants the Council of Ministers power to harmonize the
legal framework of the various member states and to use "directives" to
attain that objective." A directive is the characteristic method of
integrating EC policy into the national law of the member states.
Directives reconcile national, legislative, and administrative provisions,
which have a primary impact on the well-being of the EC.'
4 
Under the
Treaty of Rome, each member state is required to fulfill the purpose of the
directive. The specific provisions of the national law that implements the
goal of the directive and how the desired result is to be achieved, however,
are left to the legislatures of the respective member states' national
governments." This arrangement makes it necessary to examine a
directive in a particular country to ascertain whether or not it has been
adopted and implemented successfully.'
6
The Commission is responsible for introducing a directive proposal.
7
When the Commission focuses on a particular area of concern, it assembles
a working group of experts from the member states. This group of experts
8. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 3.
9. Id. arts. 52-58.
10. See James R. Silkenat, Efforts Toward Harmonization of Business Laws Within the
European Economic Community, 12 INTL LAW. 835, 836 (1978).
11. See Steven M. Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization Program ofthe European
Community, 14 LAW & POLY INT'l Bus. 293, 296 (1982).
12. ANTHONY PARRY & JAMEs DNNAGE, EEC LAW 22 (1973).
13. Cruickshank, supra note 7, at 345.
14. Id.
15. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 193.
16. Cruickshank, supra note 7, at 345.
17. PARRY & DINNAM, supra note 12, at 22.
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then confers with parties outside the EC." After studying the problem, the
Commission adopts a draft text of the proposal and submits it for
acceptance to the Council.
9 The Treaty of Rome requires that the Council
consult the Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee' prior to
commencing an examination of the Commission's proposal. After these
two bodies give their advice, the Council sets up another working group
with representatives from the member states. This group's objective is to
achieve a general concurrence on the proposal from experts in the field.
2
1
If problems are unresolved after this review, ambassadors from each
member state assemble to discuss the problems. After the remaining
problems have been mediated, the Council discusses the proposal and
usually adopts it as a Council directive.' Member states then have a
certain period of time, usually two years, in which to conform their
national laws to the directive.'
The EC securities law directives are premised primarily on the goal of
the free movement of capital-the policy that was espoused by the Treaty
of Rome." The creation of a common-capital market for the EC is con-
sidered a precondition to the goal's success.' The Commission's policy is
to establish the common capital market by encouraging greater investor
penetration of the different national-capital markets while at the same time
guaranteeing that all member states maintain effective standards of investor
protection throughout the EC.'
18. Cmickshank, supra note 7, at 345.
19. Id.
20. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, art. 189.
21. See Cruickshank, supra note 7, at 345.
22. Id.
23. Id. Under article 169 of the Treaty of Rome, the Commission can enforce the diectdve
by suing the noncomplying coonty in the Court of Justice. According to article 171, however,
a judgment is merely declaratory. Id. Therefore, the success of any harmonization program
is entirely dependent on the good faith effort of the member states. See Manuel Lorenz, EEC
Law and Other Problems in Applying the SEC Proposal on Multinational Offerings to the U.K.,
21 INLt LAW. 795, 811 (1987).
24. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, arts. 67-73.
25. Cmickshank, supra note 7, at 346.
26. id. "The process of interpenetration cannot . . . take place if some markets am
functioning well and efficiently and others not" Id.
[Vol. 12
CORPORATE TENDER OFFERS
III. THE NEED FOR TAKEOVER REGULATION IN THE EC
Until the 1950s, most corporations in Western Europe were predomi-
nantly family owned or closely held." Large, publicly held corporations,
requiring mandatory disclosure of financial information, played a small part
in most national economies.? Additionally, most corporations heavily
relied on debt rather than equity financing, and they typically relied on
banks to meet those needs.? Furthermore, the role of large institutional
investment traditionally has been small in Western Europe. As a result,
laws affecting corporations were largely void of securities regulation.
3
While mergers have been taking place in most European countries since the
1930s, takeover bids have been a more recent phenomenon.' This
historical background helps explain the diversity in takeover regulation
within the EC today.
A takeover bid or "tender offer" typically refers to an offer of money
or new securities in exchange for securities or instruments that carry voting
rights in the target company.
3  A tender offer has been defined as "a
public announcement by a company or individual, indicating that it will
pay a price above the current market price for the shares tendered of a
company it wishes to acquire or take control of.
" ' The purpose of the
tender offer typically is to acquire control of the company or to increase
the offeror's existing control. Thus, the tender offer is conditioned on the
offeror acquiring a sufficient number of shares to accomplish her goal.?
27. Manuel F. Cohen, International Securities Markets: Their Regulation, 46 ST. JOHNS L.
REv. 264, 271 (1971).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 264 n.8.
31. Id.
32. See Proposed Diretive, supra note 5, at 3.
33. See BLOOMwrht., SOURITIES LAW HANDBOK 481 (198990). The term "trnder offer- is
defined as:
IA] means of buying a substantial portion of the outstanding stock of a company
by making an offer to purchase all shares, up to a specified number, tendered by
shareholders within a specified period at a fixed price, usually at a premium above
the market price. In one sense, it is an alternative to a proxy contest for control and
is usually a more effective (but also more costly) one. At the same time, it is also
the first step in acquiring a company, since the company making the tender offer
may follow the tender offer with a merger proposal.
/d.
34. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 1468 (6th ed. 1990).
35. It should be noted that takeovers are not technically considered mergers became they
N.Y.L. SCH. . INT'L & CoMP. L.
Takeovers in the United States, both mergers and acquisitions, have
been an accepted part of American corporate life for some time.3 Europe,
however, has only recently experienced a wave of merger and acquisition
activity.' Takeovers in Europe are expected to rise dramatically in the
coming years as European companies attempt to position themselves to
compete better in the barrier-free market envisioned for the future.' Many
leading European industrialists are now realizing the benefits of takeovers,
even hostile ones, that until recently would not have been welcomed."
The difficult problem now facing the EC is how to harmonize a diverse
body of tender-offer legislation within the EC while at the same time
ensuring fairness to all member states and their corporations and sharehold-
ers.
ate legally quite different. Takeovers do not involve the dissolution of one of the companies
or the transfer of its assets or liabilities to the acquiring company. The company whose shams
ate acquiced remains in existence. See generalfy, BarDNEY & CHIRELSTON, CoRPoRATE FINANCE,
CASES AND MATERIALS (3rd ed., 1987). The law regulatingmergers within the EC is extensive
and is beyond the scope of this note.
36. The totat valne of American mergers and acquisitions in 1988 was more than $300
billion. Richard I. Kirkland Jr., Merger Mania Is Sweeping Europe, FOERTUNE, Dec. 19, 1988,
at 157.
37. Id4; see Greenhouse, Merger Mania, supra note 1, at At.
38. See Greenbose, Merger Mania, saupra note 1, at At. "To seize oppontanities presented
by te EC's push for a truly unified market by 1992, and to avoid getting clobbered by new
competitors, companies most redouble efforts to build pan-European manufacturing and
marketing muscle." Id. Robert E. Rubin, a vice-chainrmn with Goldman, Sachs & Company,
stated in 1989 tat "t think it is possible, even likely, that what you are going to see in Europe
is the same kind of environment you have seen in the United States in the last few years."
Knrk Eichenwald, A Mania for British Mergers, N.Y. Timss, July 23, 1989, § 3, at t. But see
Thomas Kamm & Philip Revzin, Takeovers Aren't Likely to Sweep Europe, WALL ST. J., Aug.
7, 1989, at A14 (stating that, as compared to the United States "thre am different systems of
raising liquidity, market funding and corporate controls." Also, despite the fact that merger and
acquisition activity has increased, much of the future restructuring "is likely to take the form
of alliances, joint ventures or fiendly takeovers rather than aggressive, debt financed raids.").
See also Greenhouse, Buyout Bulge, supra note 1, at At (stating that while hostile takeovers
are a way of life in America, they may not appeal to European gentility and animosity toward
junk bond financing).
39. See Kamm & Revzin, supra note 38, at At4. Some in upper management realize that
hostile tender offers could have a positive effect on European business by pressuring
management to take the notion of shareholder value into account Id. By raising the takeover
stakes, raiders such as Britain's Sir James Goldsmith and Italy's Carlo Di Benedeti are focing




IV. AN OVERVIEW OF EC MEMBER STATES' TAKEOVER REGULATION
The feasibility of a hostile tender offer in the EC is, in large part, a
function of patterns of share ownership in that country, voting rights
allocated to publicly held shares, the defensive tactics permitted, and the
ability of shareholders' to transfer their shares easily."o Broad restriction
on the transferability of shares is permitted by corporate statute in many
countries in continental Europe.
4
' EC member legislation concerning
tender offers differs widely with regard to the scope of application, the
various disclosure requirements, the duty to initiate an offer, the techniques
used for commencing an offer, the availability of defensive action and
"poison pills" used by the target company to frustrate a bidder, and the
various consequences of the offer itself. Many member states regulate only
those transactions involving companies listed on their own stock ex-
changes. In contrast, the United Kingdom governs takeovers encompassing
both listed and unlisted public companies and even some private companies
that were connected to the stock exchange in the ten years prior to their
acquisition.
42 
In some member states, mandatory bids are required when
an offeror's share ownership reaches certain levels, while such measures are
not required in other states.
43
Among the considerations to be addressed when proposing tender offer
regulation in the EC are the various systems of regulation currently used.
For example, in the United Kingdom, where the majority of European take-
overs occur," a comprehensive regulatory system is currently in place.
Regulation in the United Kingdom is usually described as "self-regulatory,"
as contrasted with the statutory scheme in the United States.' The guiding
40. Debomh A. Demott, Comparative Dimensions ofTakeover Regulation, 65 WAsH. U. L.Q.
69, 73 (1987).
41. ld. at 77; see generally MAEIER & GE Ns, supra note 4.
42. Nathalie Basalda, Towards the Harmonization of EC-Member States' Regulations on
Takeover Bids: The Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, 9 Nw. J.
INTL L. & Bus. 487, 490 (1989).
43. Id. For example, in Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, mandatory bids am
required when 20%, 25%, and 30% are acquired respectively. Id.
44. See Robert J. Cole, Takeover Fever is High in Britain, N.Y. TIMeS, Apr. 11, 1989, at
D2. "Figures compiled by Goldman, Sachs & Company show them were 154 large deals in
Britain last year [19881 with a total value of $72 billion. This was up 56% from 1987 when
them were 94 deals worth a total of $46 billion." Id.
45. It has been said that he contrast be ween the British and American systems can be
educed to a pair of observations: "It is better tobe a shareholder in Britain. It is bettertobe
a lawyer in America." Takeovers: The Right Way to Regulate the Market, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23,
1919, at 22.
1991]
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force behind the United Kingdom's system is the City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers (the "City Code").' The City Code, which was enacted in
1968, is issued by the City Working Party'e and is administered by the
Panel.
4  
The City Code does not have the force of law.' However, the
Takeover Panel, as a private organization run by the securities industry, can
enforce the City Code. The Panel exercises real power over the financial
community through its ability to ban investment advisors who violate its
Code." The Code requires extensive disclosure by bidders,5' sets a
minimum duration for offers," and requires prorated acceptance for
oversubscribed partial bids.
53 
The City Code regulates the conditions a
bidder is likely to impose on offers' and permits bidders to purchase
shares outside the offer itself after the tender offer has been announced.
55
46. See CrrY CODE, supra note 3, at 4513. The City Code consists of ten general principals
and thirty-eight mites. Id. There am five rles addressing the issue of substantial share
acquisition.
The [General Principals or GP's] are a codification of 'good standards of commer-
cial behavior' intended to have an obvious and universal application, while the
Rues are intended to be examples of the application of the [GPs], or am rles of
procedure to govern takeovers and mergers. As such, the Rules ate to be
interpreted in the light of the [GPs and the broad expression of intention in the
[GFs]. Furthermore, the City Code imposes the spirit as well as the precise
wording of the [Gls] and Rues to be observed, extending to areas and cir-
cunmstances not explicitly covered by any rle.
Sappiden, Takeover Bids and Target Shareholder Protection: The Regulatory Framework in
the United Kingdom, United States and Australia, 8 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. MKT. L. 281, 305
a.25 (1986).
47. "The City Working Party is an ad hoc group of individuals representing various ectional
interests such as the accepting houses, investment hrust companies, the insuiunce industry and
the tssuing Houses Association." Sappideen, supra note 46, at 305 n.26.
48. The Panel consists of
[tlhe chairmen of the various sponsoring organizations. It also includes the
President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, a representative of the
Confederation of British Industry, and a representative of the Govemor of the Bank
of England who is Deputy Chairman of the Panel. The Chairman is an independent
outsider.
Id. at 305 n.27.
49. See CITY CODE, supra note 3, at 4513.
50. See Cole, supra note 44, at D2.
51. See CrTY CoDE, supra note 3, at 4555-58.
52. Id. "An offer must initially be open for at least 21 days following the date on which the
offer document is posted." Id. at 4568.
53. Id. at 4575.
54. Id. at 4545.
55. Id. at 4561.
[Vol. 12
CORPORATE TENDER OFFERS
The City Code also requires that any person (or those acting in concert
with him) who acquires a thirty-percent stake in a company must make an
offer for all the remaining shares at the highest price paid during the
preceding twelve months.
In Germany, a country where hostile takeovers are rare,' there is no
existing regulatory authority to oversee takeovers.' There are a number
of reasons that account for the lack of tender offer activity in Germany.
First, shares of stock in German companies typically are not widely held,
making share acquisition by a raider on the open market difficult."
Second, despite the fact that German companies may lack anti-takeover
defenses-he so called "poison pills" that have become commonplace in
America-many large German banks have significant holdings in these
companies. This can often effectively protect them from hostile take-
overs.' Third, many companies have rules that limit the voting power of
56. Id.
The City Code's imposition of a buyout requirement accomplishes a number of
separate goals. First, it insures that all shareholders, non-contolling as well as
controlling, will share equally in any premium paid by a buyer so long as at least
thiny percent of the company's shares aw sold. Second, it protects non-selling
shareholders against the risk that the new controlling shareholder will exploit its
position to their disadvantage. Third, it eliminates the possibility that non-selling
shareholders (especially those in the wake of a successful partial bid) will be bought
out in a freee-one merger for a lesser consideration than that of the tender offer.
Demot, supra note 40, at 94-95.
57. See Kirkland, supra note 36, at I66 Reasons for the lack of takeover activity in
Germany include a relatively underdeveloped stock market, closely held public companies, and
laws allowing the transfer of stock to "friendly hands." Basaldna, supra note 42, at 493-94.
Also, Germany has only 474 publicly traded companies, and German banks ofen own large
blocks of these shares, so the chances for successful hostile tender offers are diminished. Id.
Historically, Gereany's powerful Cartel Office also has created obstacles for foreign porchasers.
Blanca Riemer, On the Continent. Raiders Still Have a Long Way to Go, Bus. WK., Mar. 7,
1988, at 46. See generally HOSTLE TAKEOVERS, sapr. note 4, at 113-14.
58. Simon MacLachlan & William Mackesy, Acquisitions of Companies in Europe-
Practicability, Disclosure, and Regalarion: An Overview, 23 INT'L LAW. 373, 392 (1989).
59. Lawrence j. DeMaria, Ideas for Picking Stocks in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1988,
at D 1. "The West Germans are not a stockholding people. Only about 3.5 million of them own
stocks, compared with 47 million Americans - roughly one of every 20 Germans and one of




60. For example, Deutsche Bank A.G. owns more than 25% of Daimler-Bena and more than
12.5% of the Hapag-Lloyd shipping Company. The daunting power of Germany's banks, which
usually have key positions on most corporate boards, discourages most takeovers. Several
German stock analysts said that when the Flick brothers tried to take over Feldmuehle Nobel
A.G. last spring, Deutsche Bank quickly bid up the stock price so high that the target became
unappetizing. Steven Greenhouse, Swiss and Germans use 'National Poison Pill," N.Y. TiMEs,
1991]
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shareholders, regardless of the extent of their equity holdings.6' Many
German finns have a statute clause that effectively prevents a single share-
holder from controlling a majority of the voting rights of the corporation.'
A hostile bid can not ultimately be successful unless the shares available
for acquisition possess sufficient voting rights to entitle their owner to
control the board, and, therefore, control the corporation. Finally, many
German companies have extensive cross-holdings that frustrate hostile
takeovers." German officials are quick to point out however, that their
companies have been able to grow steadily, partly because management
does not have to focus on short term goals, as is often the case in Amer-
ica. Still, some predict that it is only a matter of time before hostile
tender offers become a fact of corporate life in Germany." The end result
is that in Germany significant regulatory enforcement mechanisms do not
currently exist to protect investors from potential corporate misconduct.
In the Netherlands, regulatory takeover legislation has not been
enacted. Takeovers are regulated by the Merger Committee established by
the Social and Economic Council, but its enforcement mechanisms lack
Aug. 26, 1988, at D3.
61. Id.
62. The clause-used by Deutsche Bank, tire-maker Continental AG, utility
Veba A.G. and chemical concern Bayer AG to name a few-restricts a
shareholders voting rights to five percent even if he holds a larger stake
of the shae capital .... This gives the management of a company a
great deal of power and security against any hostile attack ... frhe
dual West German system of a supervisory and a management board is
another deterrent against hostile takeovers. The shareholders appoint
the supervisory board, made up of administrators for the major
shareholders and by employee representatives, which in tm appoints
the management board. To change the supervisory board, and gain
control of the company, the takeover bidder must call a shareholders'
meeting and win more than half of the votes. This all takes time and
is very costly for a takeover bidder who is financing his bid with a loan
.... In the United States, you can kick out the management from one
day to the next. Here, you can't
Old-Boy Network, Legal Traps Shield German Firms from Attack, Reuter Bus. Rep., Mar. 9,
1988, available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Omni file.
63. Terence Roth, New Takeover Ware Sets Tone in European Markets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
1989, at 8.
64. See Greenhouse, Buyout Bulge, supra note 1, at F6. "We should remember that some
of the countries most hostile to nfriendly takeovers have some of the most efficient economies
in the world." Id.
65. "Some bankers and businessmen think Germany could be ripe for hostile takeovers andeven LBOs because its cozy protection system has spared many companies the restructuring
other European concems have had to undertake." Kanm & Revzin, supra note 38, at A14.
[Vol. 12
CORPORATE TENDER OFFERS
substance.' In addition, the government of the Netherlands permits ex-
tensive and-takeover measures.Y
In France, continental Europe's leader in takeover activity,
6
' regulation
is a fairly complex combination of statutory and non-statutory authority.
The Stock Exchange Council, the French Stock Exchange, the Stock
Exchange Commission, and the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and
Budget all act in combination to regulate both the terms of the bid and the
proper disclosure documentation required.' In France, the Code des
Societes allows a French corporation's chatter to require that transfers to
.a third party whomever he may be," be subject to the corporation's con-
sent.
0 If the corporation does not consent to the transfer it may repurchase
the shares itself or cause them to be purchased by a friendly shareholder
or some other third party.
7
'
Italy does not address takeover regulation in its laws specifically, but
the Commission for Companies and Stock Exchange ("CONSOB")
exercises some control in this area.' The character and dimension of this
control, however, is currently unclear and under discussion."
In Belgium, the Banking Commission supervises public takeovers. Its
sole power is to veto the making of an offer for up to three months and to
publicize its decision.
74 The recent case involving Carlo Di Benedetti's
unsuccessful takeover bid for the huge Belgian holding company Societe
Generale illustrates the ineffectiveness of the Belgian regulatory system.
In its present form, it is ineffective in both maintaining fairness between
the target corporation and the offeror and in protecting the shareholders of
the target corporation.'
66. See HOSTILE TAKEOVERS,supra note 4, at 173; see also Basaldua, supra note 42, at 490.
67. Greenhoase, Buyout Bulge, supra note 1, at I6.
68. See Roth, supra note 63, at 30. "The dominant fact on the Paris market this year t19881
was the wave of takeovers .... The number of takeover transactions mote than tripled from
1987." Id. Only one-hundred takeovers took place between 1965 and 1975 and nearly all of
these wew friendly. HOsTILe TAKEOVERS, supra note 4, at 92. By 1988 over forty a year were
taking place and many of hese were hostle. id.
69. See Basalda, supra note 42, at 493.
70. CODE DES Socirns ART. 274 (Generale Dalloz 8th ed., 1985).
71. Id. art. 275.
72. See Basaldua, supra note 42, at 493; HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, supra note 4, at 161-71.
73. See Basaldua, supra note 42, at 493.
74. ld.
75. See Jonathan Kapstin et al., How Di Benedetti Botched the "Battle of Belgium ", Bus.
We., Mar. 7, 1988, at 44-46. Cado Di Benedeti, an Italian takeover specialist, launched 
a
hostile tender offer for Societe Generala de Belgique, a large, poorly run Belgian holding
1991]
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Takeover regulation in Spain is governed by the four Syndic Councils
of the official Stock Exchanges.' They possess the greatest power among
member states to control the terms of the offer, including procedure,
practice, documentation, and disclosure."
V. THE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE
In its White Paper program for removing all remaining internal
barriers in the Common Market by 1992," the Commission saw a need for
harmonizing member states' laws regarding tender offers' and announced
that it would bring forward a proposal for a directive on this subject.
Tender offers are one of the areas not yet covered in the program of
company law coordination directives under article 54 of the Treaty of
company. Id. His strategy was to intimidate Societe with a hostile offer, then placate them
with a compromise offer, Id. De Benedetti, however, did not count on the tenacious defensive
action that was waiting for him. Id. The company fought back by repurchasing large blocks
of its own shares and also by issuing new shares to friendly parties. 1d
In Prance, executives and officials alike, stung by the Italians brash entry into French
business in the past two years, eagerly joined forces with the Belgians, id. It was the strongest
signal yet that umpe's much-vaunted financial and commercial integration, planned for 1992,
could fall victim to tenacious national interests. Id.
As a result of the defensive action taken by Societe General and its allies, Di Benedetti
eventually was forced to concede defeat. Id. Bankem have estimated that among them, the
parties spent some $3 bilhion in a bid to acquire a company with a fair market value of less than
$1.5 billion. See Thomas Kauam & Mark M. Nelson, Everyone May Lose Belgian Bidding War,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1988, at 20.
76. MacLachlan & Mackesy, supra note 58, at 394.
77. Id.
78. Completing the Internal Market White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, COM(85) 310 final.
79. The Commissions interest in the subject of tender offers within the EC actually predates
the 1986 White Paper.
The Commission's interest in the regulation of takeovers started many years ago
with the formation of a working party to examine and come forward with proposals
for regulation in this field. Although discussions at that time proceeded quie a long
way, the concept of a system of control for these activities proved unacceptable to
Member States and the matter went into abeyance. Proposals for an initiative in
this area attracted little prominence in the Commission's White Paper on Completing
the Internal Market (Com(85) 310 final), although it was recognized as one of the
areas to be addressed in the context of completion of the Internal Market and the
Eumpean Parliament had requested an initiative in this aa. ....
Peter C. Peddie, EEC Securities Regulation in the Making: Emerging Common Minimum
Standards for the Issuance of and Trading in Securities; and Take-over Bid Procedures and
Defenses, in 1992: The Changing Legal Landscape for Doing Business in Europe, Practicing
Law Institute no. 493 at 205, 219 (Feb. 13, 1989).
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Rome." The stated aim of the Proposed Directive is "to afford sharehold-
ers and other interested parties equivalent standards of protection before the
law in all member states.""' This creation of a "level playing field" within
the EC is the ultimate goal of the proposal.
The proposal only applies to bids made for public companies limited
by shares, but these shares need not be quoted on any stock exchange. It
was felt that restricting the Proposal's rules only to "quoted" companies
would discriminate between shareholders of "quoted" and "unquoted"
companies by affording shareholders of "quoted" companies greater
protection.' The primary goal of the Proposed Directive is to provide that
tender offers be made on the same terms to all the holders of voting stock
of the target company."
The fundamental principal behind the Directive is set forth in article
3, which states that "[s]hareholders who are in the same position shall be
treated equally."' Article 4 details the obligation to launch a bid. So that
shareholders are treated equally, article 4 requires that an offer be launched
for the shares of the target company when a group wishing to acquire
shares, which, when added to any existing holdings or holdings of others
acting in concert with the offeror, reaches one-third of the total voting
shares of the company." Additionally, "speculative" bids are prohibited
because the offeror, upon reaching the one-third threshold, must make a
bid for all the voting shares of the company.' The aim of the thirty-
80. Proposed Directive, supra note 5, at 2.
81, Id.
82. Id at 7. "The public companies need not be quoted; to restrict the rules to quoted
companies would discriminate between the shareholders of quoted and unquoted companies by
according a higher standard of protection to the former." Id.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 9. Member states can set the threshold at lower than one-third but may not set it
above this level. This regulation has essentially been borrowed fsrom the City Code, where the
obligation exists at 30%. In France, the obligation to make a public offer commences at 33
1/3%, but unlike the Proposed Directive, an offer in France need only be for 2/3 of the
securities not for all of them. In Belgium, a public offer must be for all the securities, but there
is no threshold limit which mandates an obligatory public offer. See HOSTtLE TAKEOVERS supra
note 4, at 12. Also, a non-quoted company that is "small" or "medium" siaed may be exempt
from the Directive if it does not exceed the limits of two of the three following criteria: a
balance sheet total of 6.2 million ECU; net tumover of 12.8 million ECU and average number
of employees during the fiscal year of 250. Fourth Company Law Directive, 1968 O.J. (1,65)
8, 21; Proposed Directive, supra note 5, at 10.
86. See Proposed Directive, supra note 5, at 9. "The threshold of one-third is that from
which the offeror may exerise a blocking minority. Indeed, numerous important decisions
which, within a company, must be taken by the general meeting of shareholders, require at least
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percent rule is to prevent a person with a "blocking position" from
adversely affecting the operation of the company, and the 100% require-
ment is to ensure that all shareholders are treated alike."'
Article 6 addresses the need for a regulatory framework and lays down
the requirement that all member states establish a supervisory authority to
carry out the aims of the directive. The directive allows the member states
a great deal of flexibility in this area, provided that the supervisory powers
have effective authority to police the system.m The supervisory power
must, however, have the authority to either forbid the publication of an
offer document that is defective with reference to the directive or to force
the offeror to revise such a document at a later date.' The question of
which supervisory authority shall enforce the directive in a cross-border
takeover also is addressed in article 6. This responsibility is given to the
supervisory body in the member state where the target company has its
registered office.? The supervisory authorities of the various member
states concerned with a particular tender offer "are required to assist one
another in performing their duties and for this purpose to supply one
another with all necessary information.""O
Article 8 addresses the issue of defensive measures that may be taken
by the target company and its board to frustrate a hostile tender offer. To
promote the goal of equal treatment of shareholders, the management of
the target company "must at all times act in the interests of the compa-
ny." ' This goal is achieved by forbidding the target company from issuing
new voting shares,'o which would make it more difficult and more
a majority of two-thirds of the votes attached to the securities repoesented." Id. This is the
level used in community legislation to limit or suppress the right of preferential subscription
for cases of increase of capital, for the reduction of capital, for the total or partial writing-off
of capital and for operations such as mergers or scissions.
The supervisory authority, however, has the flexibility to exempt a person or group fromthis provision if the shares were acquired in an accidental manner, such as by inheritance ordonations. See id. at 10. A mandatory bid in these situations could be incompatible with
shareholder interests or the interests of this Directive. See id.
87. See HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, supra note 4, at 12.
88. Proposed Directive, supra note 5, at 10.
89. Id.
90, Id. at 11.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 12.
93. id. Article 8 is similar to article 21 of the City Code. Both am designed to preventmembers of the board of directors from putting their own elf-interest in protecting their
management positions above the interests of the shareholders.
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expensive for the offeror to acquire control. In addition, the board of the
target company may not "engage in operations of an exceptional nature
which might cause a substantial loss of the company's assets.
" " Opera-
tions of an exceptional nature are defined as "those which are not carried
out in the normal course of the company's business or not in conformity
with normal market practice.""
The minimum content of the offer document is set out in article 10.
To start, the document must name the offeree company, its registered
agent, and the offeror. It also must state the particular securities for which
the bid is made and the holdings of such securities already controlled by
the offeror and persons acting in concert with the offeror and the voting
rights of those securities already held.' The offer document must detail
the consideration to be offered for each security and the standard used for
calculating it, and where the offer is for cash or partial cash, the offeror
must provide assurance of the offeror's capability to meet the financial
responsibility resulting from the bid.' An important feature of the offer
document deals with the duty to disclose any debt that may be incurred as
a result of financing the bid. The offeror must state clearly in his offer
whether his financing of the takeover will burden the target company with
debt, and he must specify the importance of this future indebtedness." The
offer also must state the intentions of the offeror regarding the continuation
The main aim of the provisions is to protect the shareholders against an egotistical
reaction by the board of directors; the conflict in interests with which the board of
directors is confronted is ferocious, if they can hold on to their own positions by
setting up a means of defense after publication of an offer.
HOSTILE TAKEOVERS, supra note 4, at 10. New voting shaes can be issued if, at a general
meeting of the shareholders, the measure is approved. See also Proposed Directive, supra note
5, at 12.
94. Proposed Directive, supra note 5, at 8. These abnormal business practices could include
such things as selling off parts of the business to reduce the worth of the company (the so-
caled "crown jewel" defense) or burdening the company with an inordinate level of debt to
make it less attractive to the offerer. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 12-13.
97. Id. at 13. This measure is designed to disclose the use of "junk bond" financing and the
potential valuation problems associated with this type of financing.
98. Id. The commentary to Article 10 states in part:
In the interest of all parties to the bid and taking into account the social policy of
the Commission, it seems indispensable to make clear in the offer document the
intentions of the offeror concerning the future of the offeree company, especially
as regards its activities, including the use of its assets but also as regards its
management and staff.
1991]
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of the business of the offerce company, " including the future use of its
assetst and the composition of its board and employees."°  Where the
offer is for securities in exchange for the voting shares of the target
company, the Directive requires that "the recipients of the offer will
receive full disclosure concerning the shares which are being offered to
them."- 1
Article 11 regulates the publication of the offer document. Sharehold-
ers must be given the opportunity to evaluate the offer for their shares and
be given time to determine whether or not to sell. Under article 11 this
may be accomplished either by full publication of the offer document in
one of the national mass-circulation newspapers and in the official
gazette,ff or the offeror may "announce . .. in some other medium
approved by the supervisory authority, that the documents are available at
stated addresses."" 4 Where all the securities that the offeror is attempting
to acquire are registered, the offeror also may circulate the offer document
to all the shareholders individually. m The offeror is required to file a copy
of all documents with the supervisory authority so that it may oversee the
implementation of the takeover rules."
Article 12 establishes the time limits within which the offerr must get
acceptance of the offer.' ° This time "may not be less than four weeks or
more than ten, from the date of publication of the offer document."'0
There were two primary concems of the Commission regarding the timing
of the offer. The first was that the period should be sufficiently long for
99. Id.
100. Id. This requirement would mke it potentially mot difficult for a leveraged buyout
group to buy the company and sell off its assets to pay back their debt.
101. Id. This prevision could provide some protection for workers who might otherwise
loose their jobs as a result of the resteucuring. See Greenhouse, Merger Mania, supra note 1,
at Al. "In what has become a political issue in some aras, a few mergers have produced
layoffs . ... in other deals, like Nesie's takeover of Rowntere, the purchaser has promised to
protect employees.- Id
102. Proposed Directive, supra note 5, at 14. The Directive "seeks to guarantee offerees
adequate information by requiing that the offer document must put the offerees in possession
of all the facts necessary to make an informed judgment of the issuer's assets and liabilities,
financial position, record and prospects." Id.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Id.
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the target company's shareholders to make an intelligent, informed decision
whether or not to tender their shares." The second concern was that if the
period for acceptance was too long, the target company might be prevented
from carrying out its normal activities and suffer economic loss."
0
Throughout the period of acceptance, the offeror is required to inform the
supervisory authority of the number of acceptances it has received to
date."' The acceptance date may only be changed if a rival bid is
launched,"
2 
unless authorization is given by the shareholder.
To allow the offeror to withdraw the bid once the shareholders have
been notified would foster abuse of the tender offer process. Therefore,
the Directive only permits the offeror to withdraw the offer in certain
limited circumstances,'" the most important being the introduction of a
rival bid."
4 The withdrawal of the bid must be communicated to the
shareholders by the same means as the offer document and to the supervi-
sory authority."
5 The board of the target company is also required to give
its opinion of the bid and must detail the arguments both for and against
acceptance. "
6
Potential abuse by the board of the target corporation often occurs
prior to acceptance of a tender offer. Management, who often control the
board, will frequently fail to disclose important information that the
109. Id.
110. Id. Another reason for not wanting the acceptance period to remain open too long
could be that a longer period for acceptance might allow the target company to engage in
defensive measures which would frustrate the goal of faimess to all the shareholders. Id.
t11. Id. at 19.
112. Id. at 15.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id. There are certain limited circumstances where an offemr will be allowed to
withdraw a bid. The most common is when there has been a competing bid for greater value
and the original tender offeror does not want to increase his bid. Id. Another ground for
withdrawal is "if the approval of the general meeting of the offeror company is not obtained
for the issue of new securities offered in exchange for the secrities bid for or if the securities
offered in exchange fail to obtain an official stock exchange listing as the offeror intended."
Id. Another case is where "the requisite judicial or adminisrative authorization for acquisition
of the shareholding is refused. A typical example would be the prohibition of the operation by
the merger control authorities." Id. The offer may also be withdrawn if "a condition of the bid
approved by the supervisory authority is not met." Id. at 16.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 16-17. Potential abuse by target management often occurs prior to acceptance
of a tender offer. Id. Frequently, management will fail to disclose important information that
the shareholders need in order to make an informed decision as to whether to tender their
shares. ld. Article 14 addresses this problem by stressing full disclosure to the shareholders
by the target company's management. Id.
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shareholders need in order to make an informed decision as to whether to
tender their shares. The commentary to article 14 addresses this problem
by stressing the requirement of full disclosure." 
7
Takeover bids are not always contested by management; indeed in
many cases the latter has negotiated the takeover and its terms with the
offeror. In the case of friendly takeovers of this kind, such matters should
not be concealed from shareholders, but should be made clear in the report
by the target company's board. The report should also specify any
agreements between the offeree company's management and the offeror
regarding the exercise of voting rights that are part of the sale of target
company's shares."5 Additionally, in making its report to its shareholders,
the target company has the duty and obligation to act in the best interest
of the company." 9
Revisions to the offer may be made up to one week before the
expiration period for acceptance with proper and immediate notification to
shareholders." This provision ensures that shareholders are informed of
revised terms on time. The opinion of the target company's board
regarding the new terms also must be publicized, and the revised-bid-terms
and the board's report must be filed with the supervisory authority.' The
"equality of treatment" principal that is central to the entire Directive is
reinforced by the provision in article 15, which requires that "all sharehold-
ers who have already accepted the previous offer may accept the revised
bid instead."' 2 Similarly, if the offeror, or persons acting in concert with
him or on his behalf, purchases shares during the offer period at a higher
price than that contained in the original offer or one of its revisions, the
offeror is obligated to pay the higher price to those shareholders who have
already accepted the offer at the original price.' So that the system
functions smoothly, the supervisory authority must be notified of the
progress of the tender offer." At the conclusion of the bidding process,
117. I
118. Id.
119. Id. at 17.
120. Id. "The offeror my not revise the offer during the last week of the acceptance period




121. Id. at 18.
122. Id. This provision enables a shareholder who has tendered shares at a lower price, to
realize the true value of the shares.
123. Id. at 18 "The effect of these acquisitions is the increase of the consideration for
offers already accepted. Inthis way, once again, the principal of equality of treatnent is
respected." Id.
124. "Throughout the period for acceptance of the bid the offeror should be required to
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the offeror must disclose the outcome to the shareholders by the same
means used for publication of the bid.'" The offeror also must notify the
supervisory authority of the outcome.t
26
The Directive also addresses concerns about the welfare of the workers
of the target company. Because a takeover may have drastic consequences
that directly bear on the lives of the target company's employees, the
Directive mandates that the management of the target company disclose all
takeover bid documents to the employee's representatives.'
z
Competing bids are dealt with in article 20. First, all competing bids
must comply with the same rules as the initial bid in terms of procedure,
timing, content, and notification to the target shareholders as well as the
recommendation report of the target company's board.'" In addition, the
competing bidder is required to notify the shareholders of its offer
document before the period for acceptance of the initial bid expires.' The
original offeror may withdraw its offer in the face of a competing bid.t"e
The extension then must be communicated to both the shareholders and the
supervisory authority in the usual way.
13'
One of the greatest potential problems the Proposed Directive faces is
enforcement. The directive authorizes each member state to create its own
supervisory body in order to implement the goals of the Directive.
32 A
major concern is that these various national bodies may not apply the
inforn the supervisory authority at any time, on request, of the number of acceptances received
to date." Id. at 19.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 19-20.




132. See id. at 1O. The commentary to Article 6 states:
Member States ate required to designate a supervisory authority or authorities to
monitor compliance with the rates by all bid parties and must informi the
Corsmission of their arrangements, including the division of responsibilities between
the authorities if several bodies have regulatory functions in the area. The Directive
leaves it to member states to decide whether a public or private or a nationally or
regionally organized body is designated and how the authority operates, provided
it has the neccsary powers to effectively police the system and to see that the
Directive is respected. In this respect, the authority (or authorities) must have in
every case either the power to forbid the publication of an offer document that is
incomplete by reference to the requirements of the directive, or the power to oblige
the offeror to revise such document at a later date.
19911
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Directive uniformly throughout the EC or may let national interests impede
fair implementation of the Directive.' 33
The Directive addresses these enforcement considerations by proposing
that a "Contact Committee" be established under the auspices of the
Commission to address three goals.t 3 The first goal is "to facilitate the
uniform application of this Directive through regular consultations on . .
* practical problems arising in its implementation. " 13 The second is to
bring together member states to "ensure concerted action upon the policies
followed by the Member States in order to obtain reciprocal treatment for
Community nationals and companies as regards the acquisition of securities
of a company by means of a takeover bid." t" And third, to provide a
forum "to advise the Commission, if necessary, on additions or amend-
ments to this Directive." 3 7
Because the chances of completing a successful takeover vary
dramatically, a key issue, the matter of reciprocity, is raised, but not
resolved, in the preamble of the Proposed Directive."' The Proposed
Directive states in its introduction:
The situation within the Community is not as open as one may
think. Indeed, company law in several Member States also allows
companies to adopt a range of defensive measures to ensure that
control of the company remains in the hands of friendly share-
holders . . . . Against this background, and given the lacunae
which exists within the Community, it would be premature to
introduce a reciprocity clause now at the community level. For
the time being, and until subsequent harmonization, Member
States may introduce such a clause into their national law, bearing
in mind their national commitments.' 9
133. See Riemer, supra note 57, at 46 (suggesting that old-fashioned nationalism plays a key
role in determining whether a government will allow a foreigner, even an EC-national, to mount
a takeover of a domestic company that is believed to hold some "national interest," and
doubting that this practice wil change in the near future).
134. "The 'Contract Committee' shall be made up of tepresentatives of the Member States
and representatives of the Commission. The Chairman shall be a representative of the
Coonmission." Proposed Directive, supra note 5 at, 40.
135. Id at 41.
136. Id.
137. Id
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. at 5-6.
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The difficulty caused by not adopting a reciprocity clause is that
unfairness is created within the EC. For example, by allowing companies
in a country where hostile tender offers are difficult, such as Germany, to
launch successful tender offers of companies in member states where
extensive defensive action by the target company is not permitted, such as
Great Britain, the principal of the "level playing field" is circumvented.'"
It seems inequitable to permit a German company to successfully takeover
a British company but to not allow a British company the same opportunity
in Germany. This concern was voiced recently when Siemens, a large Ger-
man electronics concern, was able to complete a successful hostile bid for
Plessy, a British firm.'
4
'
In late November 1989, the Commission met and discussed a proposal
to "attack barriers used in some European Community countries to thwart
hostile corporate takeovers.
"  While not directly addressing the issue of
reciprocity, the Commission was concerned that a "level playing field"
could not exist if all countries had equal barriers to takeovers. In response
to complaints and pressure" from Great Britain about regulatory obstacles
that "make it difficult or impossible for one company to take over
another,"' Commissioner Martin Bangemann announced that in addition
to the Proposed Directive on takeovers, additional steps must be taken to
ensure fairness. He said that the Commission planned to put forward
measures to address defensive practices, such as share repurchasing by the
target company, the limitation of share voting rights, defensive cross-
holdings between a parent company and its subsidiary, "poison pill"
defenses, and massive issuing of new shares to friendly shareholders to
dilute the stake in the target held by the hostile bidder.'
45
140. See Greenhouse, Buyout Bulge, supra note 1, at F6.
141. Id. One author has soid:
At the moment, the differences in attitdes among the European nations are creating
friction. For example, many in Brit[ain] complain that Siemens, the electronics
concern, could make a successful hostile bid for Plessy, the British electronics
company, but a British concern would almost certainly fail in a hostile offer for a
West German entity.
Id.
142. See Tony Carnt, EC Commission Pledges Attack on Barriers to Company Takeovers,
Reuters Bus. Rep., Nov. 23, 1989, available in Lexs, Nexis Library, Osni file.
143. Id. "London has said it will not sign up to a key EC plan to establish common roles
for investigating big company mergers unless other govemments agree to take down [takeover]
barriers." Id.
144. Id.
145. Comsissioner Bangeman stated that:
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The influence of the British City Code on the proposal is obvious.
The effect of the new proposal would be to create a structure similar to the
British position under the City Code, such that target management may not
institute defensive measures to frustrate a hostile takeover attempt unless
the target shareholders have approved such measures.S By drastically
limiting anti-takeover defenses available to target management, the Com-
mission would be taking a large step to correct the present imbalance in
shareholder protection within the Community, something not addressed in
the Proposed Directive.
The Proposed Directive thus attempts to establish a uniform system of
regulation within the EC while allowing for necessary flexibility among
differently situated member states. 47 At the same time, the Contact
Committee will be in place to monitor the uniform application of the
Directive and to provide continuing guidance in the area of takeover
regulation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Single European Act,it which created institutional procedures to
eliminate barriers between member states by 1992, began the process that
[A] study by outside consultants for the Commission, the EC's executive body, had
shown that a host of legal and administrative obstacles made hostile takeover bids
'practically impossible' in several member states . . . he soid the commission
planned to put forward measures by the end of March (1990] to ensure that
companies threatened by takeovers could not buy their own shares to defend
themselves without obtaining the approval of their shareholders first. The measures
would also ensure that only a simple majority of shareholders would he required to
appoint or dismiss diectors of a target company. The study found this was
impossible in some member states.
Id.
146. See CITY Coos, supra note 3.
147. Although the Proposed Dimetive would be a flexible system with a minimum of
burdensome technical regulations, it would still represent a significant change for the U.K.
Bitain is most concerned with the Proposed Diective because it has the most at stake. It has
the largest and most dynamic financial system within the EC, and Britain already has its own
complex regulatory system in place (City Code). This system is primarily a "code of conduct,"
rather than statutory or mle-based regulation. Id. In the U.K., regulation is based as much on
the spirit of the roles as it is on the rles themselves. Although the Proposed Diective was in
some respects modeled on the U.K Take-Over Code, its adopion as a Directive in the manner
proposed would represent a significant departure from a "self-regulatory" system of regulation
to a statutory one. See Pedde, supra note 79, at 220. "This... would be likely to result in
a sedous loss of flexibility, and increase the risk of recourse to the courts in the course of a bid,
creating uncertainty for the parties to takeovers, their shareholders and the market." Id.
148. Single European Act, 1987 O.J (L169) 29 (Feb. 17, 1986).
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has led the European Commission to draft the Proposal for a Thirteenth
Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and Other
General Bids. This Draft Proposal is a much needed piece of EC
legislation. The Proposal addresses an area of company law badly in need
of direction. The current uneven patchwork of laws regulating takeover
activity within the EC presents a hindrance to the principal of the free
movement of capital, which is espoused in the Treaty of Rome.'
49 If the
harmonization of tender offer legislation is to succeed, it will be necessary
to take into consideration the various member states' traditions and
economic concerns. Harmonization will, in many instances, involve a
major transformation in the accepted way of transacting business. This
process of change necessarily will take time to be implemented and
administered. It should not be forced.S The proposal accomplishes its
goal of tender offer regulation with a minimum of regulatory burdens, and
with centralized control, it maintains enough flexibility to adapt to twelve
very different national economies and pre-existing regulatory systems. If
the Proposal can be implemented uniformly and administered throughout
the EC states' authorities, it will contribute greatly to a truly unified market
in 1992 and beyond.
Jonathan S. Chester
149. Treaty of Rome, supra note 7, at 3.
150. See MABJER & GEENS, supra note 4, at 6.

